

Political consensus: A study on the nature of the crisis of the pluralist system in Iraq

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ABSTRACT

The topics of this paper deal with problems of political consensus in Iraq as one of the most controversial dilemmas of the Pluralist system in Iraq. Most societies that have lived for long periods under totalitarian and tyrannical regimes witness a number of obstacles and problems associated with democratic transformation or any transformation that leads to changing the character of the previous totalitarian regime. Any peaceful change or development can affect its political structures and institutions. Consequently, the obstacles to a real democratic transformation were more complex as a result of the presence of a set of political, social and economic structures that were not the product of the previous totalitarian regime but were the result of long periods of intellectual decadence and political tyranny and what was entrenched in society The Iraqi people have traditional values and institutions that are no longer compatible in their existence with the contemporary paths of democratic systems.

Keywords: Political Conesus, Pluralism, Democracy in Iraq, political parties in Iraq, Political transformation

Introduction:

A democratic transition is a group of movements from an undemocratic regime to a democratic regime, which occur in a specific period of time and outnumber the movement in the opposite directions in a different period.

The process of democratic transition is, in fact, a process of gradual change in the political system that leads to an increase in the role of individuals and groups in the decision-making process through representation and holding elections, which are considered complementary measures to the process of democratic transition, but they are not considered sufficient to achieve the transformation unless political pluralism is carried out Reducing the

centralization of power, releasing freedoms, creating an effective civil society, and a complete separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

It must be said that the process of democratic transformation is, in fact, a permanent process and not a transformation as it is linked to a set of values that support transformation and seek to consolidate it. The cognitive and ethical so that the whole reality is subject to the general, impersonal rules and procedures, as the main objective of any transformation process is to develop the capabilities of government institutions to increase their effectiveness and raise the level of their performance so that they can fulfil the duties assigned to them.

This school includes the link between liberal democracy and economic progress and the necessity of providing a number of economic and social conditions for the success of the democratic transition process. Little by little, changes in the structure of the political system.

Methods:

The paper relied on the historical and systemic approach to identify the reasons that prompted the Iraqi political system after 2003 to rely on the consensual system. Positive discrimination in the sense of granting all the oppressed groups of society a certain share in the political system and then consensus regarding these political quotas. It cannot be said that the constitutional arrangements that Iraq witnessed after the year 2003 have established constitutionalism within the system as much as it was a custom that was codified.

Results:

It can be said that there are a number of problems that prevented a transition to the democratic system in its active form in Iraq after 2003, and these problems are related to the historical, social and political structure that the Iraqi society is burdened with and which made its structures difficult to accept the democratic transformation and its mechanisms that are the product of an industrial society And advanced technology and intellectual structures that have gone beyond the intellectual and social structures that dominate the Iraqi social scene.

The research was concerned with explaining the most important social, political and economic obstacles that prevent the existence of a democratic system in Iraq, and these obstacles are all the result of a traditional social structure in which the values of tyranny and authoritarianism prevailed from the authorities that successively ruled Iraq and the intellectual unilateralism that led to the other opinion and the rentier economic pattern Which stifled the individual initiative and these factors interacted with the sovereignty of the stereotypical personality with a negative obsessive orientation, which marked the actors in the political process in Iraq after 2003 so that the problematic picture was intertwined with a regional and international environment that did not deal positively with the outcomes of change in Iraq for sectarian or interest reasons. Which made the political process in Iraq a tool for generating political crises, and the existence of the established regime became an essential part of the crisis instead of being one of the tools for its solution. Decision-making centers, institutions and organs of governance, and its educational and educational institutions leaving its shadows on the nature of the world Societal Qat between the groups that make up the Iraqi society.

Conclusions:

The policies followed the fall of the previous regime contributed to the incomplete vision of how to create appropriate climates capable of creating factors that create or enhance societal integration and affirm the principle of citizenship, which contributed to increasing the great rift that already exists in the Iraqi community structure, and such policies led to the

fragmentation of society and the rule of law. Ethnic and sectarian loyalties and making the Iraqi components enter into bloody conflicts, and the struggle to win spoils and endorse the state apparatus in favor of a certain party has become an attempt to impose a new identity that in most cases is an ideological identity that does not take into account the difference and diversity that exists in the nature of Iraqi society, which stimulated the opinion that we had We put it at the beginning of the research, which is that Iraq was nothing but a crisis and artificial state, because it bears in its roots that were established on its basis in the modern era the seeds of disintegration and division as a result of its exclusionary nature, and it did not have the elite capable of overcoming any sectarian or ethnic differences, as successive policies produced the character of hostility and desire In revenge for the groups that were crushed in the past eras and who could not overcome past pain or get out of The thought of the opposition to the broader state thought, and it must be said that there are a number of scenarios presented in relation to the Iraqi reality and what can result from it within the framework of the question about the possibility of the integration or separation of the basic groups that make up the society, and is it possible to overcome the negatives and mistakes of the recent past in order to build a state It is based on coexistence and homogeneity between the various components through the supremacy of the principle of equality, which is supposed to be available to all citizens and equal opportunities and the adoption of the values of moderation and moderation instead of extremism and the belief that Iraq is the homeland of all and will not be the preserve of a sect, sect or nationality.

Literature Survey

Meaning of Consensus and Consensual Governments:

It is a general agreement between political parties to run the country's affairs on consensual bases regardless of the size of their real parliamentary representation (large parties and small parties). The classic example of this concept is reflected in the policies and performance of European governments after World War II, especially in Britain. Because this concept appeared immediately after the war, it was called in some political references the political consensus of the post-war period.

The principle of consensus is an alternative model to competitive democracy or representative democracy, as it is born under conditions based on racial, ethnic and societal division, ethnic and racial disparities, weakness of national unity, the difficulty of political stability and frequent waves of violence between societal components.

Some political systems have adopted the consensual model for reasons including:

The failure of the democratic system based on the majority in the event that the rule of the majority did not meet all the aspirations and desires of the people, and this means that the consensus was based on a well-established democratic base and not an emerging one.

It seemed that the consensus mechanism was somewhat necessary for post-2003 Iraq, especially since it followed a phase when there was a monopoly of power and the deprivation of the majority of the people from participating in government and public affairs.

The requirements for consensus are numerous, perhaps the most important of which is the existence of real and balanced political institutions and an open political system for the societal and political organizations that the parties represent primarily.

This calls for building a value system, i.e., activating the values of democracy and political transition and making them effective and capable of distributing power in society to achieve real democracy, not formal or institutional, and this means acknowledgment of pluralism within an effective value system. The process of building power or re-correction of its path and seeking to weave political relations that ultimately lead to the administration of the state through the greatest degree of political and social consensus around it. Countries with different social, ethnic and religious fabrics.

Consensus is related to the degree to which the logic of political concessions can be reached, which is imposed during the management of partnership with the rest of the components of the old regimes and the awareness of their economic capabilities, experiences, network of relations, and possibilities of returning to power. To obtain the largest possible gains by rebuilding the state and repositioning itself in its joints, to give more spaces for interest and pragmatic considerations, creating a fiercely competitive environment.

The main advantage of a democratic system based on consensus is the existence of a broad coalition to rule a country. This coalition is either in the form of a large presidential coalition, a government coalition or through a committee with broad powers. Of course, the consensus mechanism depends on the existence of a written constitution that clearly includes the mechanism of governance, how power is transferred and how elections are organized. The mutual veto is an important mechanism of the mechanisms adopted by consensual rule or consensus as a form of governance. The mutual veto is an expression of negative minority rule. Sectoral independence also indicates one of the advantages of the consociational system and is reflected in the extent to which all components of the plural society are able to independently manage its internal affairs, and this leads to the strengthening of consociational democracy and enhances its continuity. Societies are more pluralistic, and they do not aim to remove or weaken sectoral divisions but rather to explicitly recognize them and transform these sectors into elements for building a stable democratic system.

It must be said that most of the opinions and orientations that dealt with the mechanisms and ways of the consensual system were considered logical mechanisms, provided that they take place in a temporary stage to provide sufficient guarantees to dispel the fears of the minority from the orientations of the majority, meaning that they are consensual by achieving common goals and strengthening national harmony, and this means that they are on the contrary. From representative democracy, consensual democracy is not based on the elements of competition in programs and strategies, appeal to the logic of the ruling majority and the opposition minority, and frequent dependence on the method of voting or election. Rather, it depends mainly on the specifications of building large alliances that guarantee the basic components opportunities for representation and participation in decision-making from the top of the pyramid to the bottom without being subject to the domination of the majority.

The beginnings of the adoption of consensus mechanisms in Iraq were with the establishment of the Governing Council, which derived its legitimacy from the ninth paragraph of Resolution 1483 issued by the Security Council, which stipulated that the people of Iraq, with the assistance of the coalition authority that the United States assigned to administer Iraq after the ninth of April 2003 and working with the Special Representative of the United Nations, The United Nations established a temporary Iraqi lease as a transitional administration run by the Iraqis until the people of Iraq establish an internationally recognized representative government that assumes the responsibilities of the authority. The representative of the

Assyrians was considered a representative of the Christians, and the composition of the Governing Council had clarified the foundations of consensual democracy in Iraq, which I wanted to prevail in the political life in Iraq because the Council was based on a mechanism of proportional representation of all Iraqi sects, nationalities, religions and political forces, and the work remained on the basis of consensus in the government of Iyad Allawi and then the government of Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nuri al-Maliki in its two sessions in 2006 and 2010. The experience of the consociational system in Iraq has entailed great ambiguity, both at the theoretical and practical levels, as the period following the first legislative elections in 2005 witnessed the formation of the Iraqi government in accordance with consensual democracy, in whose shadow no political bloc is able to unilaterally rule and marginalize other blocs, no matter who the victorious party is. Electorally, and then none of the winning parties was able to form a government because of the adoption of sectarian quotas as a basis in the political process. Despite Iraq's possession of the conditions for a parliamentary majority, the political consensus overshadowed the electoral process, which is the true standard for democracy. We will explain the reasons that prompted the political blocs to adopt consensus in its image. Negativity, which has become an obstacle to political action in its true democratic frameworks. It can be said that democracy in Iraq is an emerging consensual democracy and not ideal. The political consensus that was the first criterion in the political process emerged from the way the government was formed, which followed the 2010 elections, which was hoped to produce a strong authority and a strong opposition, but what happened was the opposite, and that When the national unity government was formed, and an effective parliamentary opposition was not formed that monitored the government's work. Therefore, it faced the consensus mechanism, and there are still a number of problems, the most important of which is building national unity and formulating public policies.

The question that imposes itself is manifested in the presence or absence of Iraqi national unity or the features of a unified Iraqi national identity, and this requires knowing the origins of this identity and the roots of feeling the features of this identity and how its foundations collapsed until doubt and suspicion became an alternative to building bridges of trust between the various members of Iraqi society, which made a mechanism Al-Tawafuq took negative dimensions after the political transition in 2003.

If we follow the roots of the Iraqi national identity, we will find that the feeling of the people being one people did not exist during the Ottoman era, which extended for five centuries, and there was no feeling of the existence of a single political group, for the Arabs, for example, were a group of distinct and different societies as well as the existence of groups Other Iraqis, such as the Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, Persians, and there are Jews, Sabaeans, Mandaeans and Yazidis.

In the modern and contemporary history of Iraq, no party has emerged that believes that there is a comprehensive Iraqi identity that distances itself from other sub-identities. The parties that are described as progressive parties did not seek to discuss the details of the other sub-identities that make up Iraqi society, and therefore did not provide appropriate solutions to address any crisis that might arise. The relationship of power with any sectarian or ethnic group. The historical experience that Iraq has experienced during the past decades has revealed that the failure to address how to deal with Iraqi components and sometimes covering up their existence or their religious and ritual practices and their popular folklore has prompted them to take a position of isolation and isolation, and then seek To make its demands respecting its

different or distinct status from the group, it adopts a method based on violence, or it may resort to emigration to escape a situation in which its religious, sectarian or ethnic specificity is not respected. It must be recalled that the Iraqi state has sought to perpetuate a totalitarian ideological discourse that seeks to declare possession of the absolute truth with the exclusion of cultural discourses of other ethnic and sectarian groups as well as political groups. Glorifying the leader or leader instead of the homeland or the nation in return for the systematic suppression of any opposition force, which made the idea of the Iraqi homeland or identity an idea hidden from the generations that arose under the repressive regimes that Iraq witnessed after the year 1963 and with the consecration of this authoritarian culture, the features of this tyrannical culture were obliterated Other cultures or the deletion of undesirable models from authoritarian regimes. The institutions of socialization, including the educational systems, have contributed to perpetuating a culture based on contempt for different others, even if he is an essential partner in the homeland, which made it difficult to integrate the components of the Iraqi people and made the Iraqi individual seek his component. Doctrinal, religious, or ethnic, instead of being drawn to the homeland through the principle of citizenship, and the visions of each Iraqi group shaped their own perceptions. A connection with other groups through their references and perceptions based on their intellectual heritage and were, in any case, visions derived from past eras rather than based on the experience of coexistence or the everyday struggle between the various Iraqi components.

The dictatorial regimes that governed Iraq until 2003 established a state of rupture in identity and weakened the bond of integration between the Iraqi components. It is already known that the main motive for any dictatorial regime is the weakness of the social base of the ruling class, which resorts to relying on a minority that represents only a part of the people. This may be The minority is a clan, sectarian, religious, regional, or political grouping, or all together, as is the case with Iraq, in order to compensate for the weak social base of power. Repressive and intelligence agencies are also relied upon at a time when the state is able to represent the various religious, sectarian and ethnic groups. To the extent that it can reduce the reliance on force in the perpetuation of its control and dominance. The state cannot in any way be strong without being able to represent the broadest base of the nation's groups, and no state, including Iraq, can represent all the diversity of society without having a comprehensive intellectual, historical and educational basis agreed upon by all groups, no matter how different and varied their convictions and political projects. Without a unified national identity, there can be no unified national state.

The political change that took place in Iraq in the year 2003 and the events that followed, most of which represented the image of a disintegrating society suffering from a number of divisions, were nothing but a picture of the failure of the experience of the national state in Iraq since its founding in 1921. The formulas that have been used since the era of The establishment and until the collapse of the authority in 2003, I had indicated the absence of any interaction between the people and their government on the one hand and the absence of any form of social integration between the Iraqi components, and with the absence of a compelling central authority such as the one that existed in Iraq before 2003, many Iraqi groups, especially those Which was suffering from a great deal of oppression and repression that the way was opened for it to work more freely, even if its previously pent-up demands led to a fierce struggle for power that might lead to a state of rupture in the structure of the state and its structures. In Iraq, there are a number of false predictions that did not realize the existing societal and

political reality in Iraq, especially after Iraq became on the brink of civil war as a result of the absence of any possible dialogue between the main groups that it consists of, and due to the lack of trust between these groups and components, whose political elites sought to share power, and which became a personal spoiler. New and in style different from the style of state building that took place in 1921, as the establishment of the second state prevailed in a state of complete chaos, suspicion and mistrust between the various components, and each of its leaders and multiple components was keen to share what could be divided of power without paying attention to what could be done. Such a division leads to the loss of the components of a comprehensive Iraqi national identity. Perhaps the reasons that led to such division are mainly related to the structure of the authority in Iraq, which has been frequent for decades and which has led to the growth of feelings of suspicion and mistrust among the components of society and the feeling of a particular group that authority is an inherited right that others cannot approach in exchange for the feelings of groups. With the fall of the previous regime, the time has come to settle scores with the legacy of the regime, whether at the level of affiliation and loyal elements or at the level of a broad change in the administrative and political structures in a way that leads to counting the matter as a comprehensive revenge against the group that was counted against the previous regime, and of course. The growth of such feelings, which are based on fear of the future for the Sunnis, and the fear of going back to the past, with all its negatives and tools for the Shiites and the Kurds, pushed Iraq into a civil war that almost undermined any remaining form of Iraqi national unity.

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